This story, like most other analysis, tends to look at one dimension and ignore others. I agree with Brian that the Ukrainian steeling of gas, and the subsequent shutoff of supplies, had some unintended consequences, especially in the light of the economic slump. But there is more to it then meets the eye. The spot market, like Qatar, is a funny creature. The prices are not realistic at all. This are "come on" prices, that have a political dimension. On one hand, it cuts into Gazprom's business. But on the other hand, gets Nabucco screamers off European back. The "Russian alternative" is here, and is working. This will keep any potential private sector investor in Nabucco running far away. Since there is plenty of future need to satisfy, Russia is hurt only in the very short term, with long term benefits being actually enhanced. By developing a more diversified market for gas, including liquefied gas, gas exporting countries will learn how to protect their interests in THEIR infrastructure --- whether it is gas pipelines, or gas liquification plants --- and keep their market. Otherwise, the benefit would go to the capital-controlling groups that would muscle in and build infrastructure at the expense of both, producer and the consumer. Nabucco is the exhibit number one in that approach. As Nord Stream becomes a reality, and South Stream slowly takes shape across possible two corridors --- the Balkans and Italy --- the suppliers and consumers become the co-investors in infrastructure, cutting the costs and creating mutual dependencies. All that Qatar did was diffuse the Ukrainian mess, create a favorable spot market, and give Russia and Europe some quality time to move projects along. Good work everyone.