­One of the upsides to any election campaign is witnessing the parties lay out their strategic agendas for the voters. Foreign affairs normally occupy the lower tier in any party program, and the current campaign in Russia is no exception.

On the one hand, this fact suggests that Russia’s citizens are generally content with the government’s foreign policies, or at least do not bear a distinct grudge against it. Therefore, the act of criticizing it is unlikely to earn any easy points for the opposition. On the other hand, it could also mean one of the two things: either Russia has no alternative to its present foreign policy, or the government’s political opponents lack the proficiency and expertise to formulate such an alternative.

However, some of them still try, presumably being prompted by the conventions of politics. Two of the recently unveiled foreign policy strategies that appear to warrant attention come from the opposite sides of the political spectrum: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), and the Right Cause party.

Let us start with the Communists. Their agenda, which was presented at the CPRF plenary session in July this year, envisages that a “government of national confidence” shall seek to strengthen Russia’s international standing. By what means, then? According to the CPRF agenda, the national confidence government shall “start liberating the country from the dictate imposed in the form of “rules of the globalized world.” While securing Russia’s sovereign status, it will ensure favorable conditions for its development.”

It seems dubious, to say the least, that one can strengthen a country’s international standing in a globalized world while denouncing the latter’s rules. Coincidentally, one day ahead of the CPRF’s meeting in July, the Communist Party of China held a solemn ceremony to celebrate its 90th anniversary. In his keynote speech at the event, CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao proclaimed: “We will unswervingly follow the basic government policy of opening up, develop our open economy, and comprehensively improve its performance. We will strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation with countries around the world.”

It could be this principally different approach that has enabled the Chinese Communists to preside over one of the world’s largest economies today. Instead of rejecting the “rules of the globalized world”, the Chinese have accepted and followed them – and nowadays they are in a position to largely influence these rules, making other players respect their interests while remaining within the commonly accepted boundaries. Contrary to their fellow Communists in the Soviet Union (and now in Russia), the CPC has made the right conclusions concerning current globalization trends.

A pronounced focus on acting independently as a foreign policy actor does not necessarily come across as a sign of strength: sometimes it merely signals a government’s inability to bargain, make alliances and attract other players to promote one’s interests and initiatives. In today’s world, these are the skills that are particularly important for any nation that aspires to global leadership.  

Another foreign policy strategy, which has been evidently spun as something of a sensation, was recently introduced by Russian billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov, leader of the Right Cause party. Stating that Russia is “technically still enemies with Europe,” Mr. Prokhorov suggests developing our relations with Europe into a genuine friendship by integrating Russia into the Schengen area and the euro zone. While this is an indisputably trailblazing proposal, two observations need to be made.

First, even if we choose to neglect the fact that in such an event Russia’s border with China or Afghanistan would effectively become a gateway to Europe, and the latter is highly unlikely to leave Russia in charge of who enters the common European space from all of those neighboring countries, being part of the Schengen area means maintaining a common external border, and that inevitably implies introducing visas for all non-Schengen states. If Mikhail Prokhorov’s initiative were to become reality, Russia would have to impose visa regimes on Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Turkey, not to mention Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Secondly, and even more importantly, joining the euro zone would imply assuming part of the responsibility for the public debts of countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. And even during a more stable period, Russia would have to agree to report to a euro zone “government,” which was recently proposed by the leaders of Germany and France. Would that be worth it? The Czech Republic, for one, suspended its accession to the euro zone just a few days ago. And I know from personal experience how happy they are right now in Latvia, which had not rushed to adopt the Euro and thus delivered itself from many of the troubles that neighboring Estonia is currently going through.

Joining the Schengen area and the euro zone would essentially mean curtains for Russia’s union state with Belarus, as well as its customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan – and just about any integration project with its non-EU neighbors, which are much closer to Russians in many respects. Now this is a crucial choice Russia would have to face, and this is something you should tell your supporters about.

In the past few decades, Russia has experienced both of these extremes: the self-imposed isolation of the Cold War, and the similarly unilateral, naive openness of the 1990s. The current pre-election debate on foreign policy has highlighted the fact that Russia’s perennial dispute between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers continues to this day, carried on by modern-day pseudo-patriotic isolationists and geopolitical utopianists. Meanwhile, Russia’s entire history shows that neither of these two extremes has ever played out for the benefit of our national interests.

What distinguishes Russia’s present-day foreign policy from those of our past governments is the absence of either radical influences, either on the left or the right, or populist swaying between these opposing strategies. Shall we say it is perfect then? Certainly not: It should display more initiative and better creativity (such as it did in its recent dealings with Iran), as well as pursue alliances and partnerships more actively (as is already the case with the Common Economic Space). Yet in choosing its foreign policy priorities, Russia should not stick to any rigid templates from either the left of the right. As we should know better, making reasonable choices and sticking to the golden mean is most rewarding.

­Konstantin Kosachev

­The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.