­Vladimir Putin’s latest article on social policy left me with two questions. Putin once again describes how flawed the current system is. So why hasn’t Putin sorted it all out? After all, he has been running Russia for the past 12 years, and the country was awash with petrodollars. If problems weren’t solved when the economic situation was so favorable, why should we believe that they can be solved today? Putin doesn’t answer that question.

Now, my second question. It is clear from the article that the way Putin plans to resolve all these problems is by allocating more money. But that is totally wrong from the systemic point of view, isn't it? Firstly, Russia’s reserves, extensive as they are, will soon run out; in addition, given our corruption levels, much of the money will be stolen in the process anyway. Secondly, this is the wrong approach to begin with, as it spoils both the economy and the people.

I strongly believe that the way to address social problems is not through the government making additional social commitments; it is by improving social mobility. For example, we need the middle class to grow. Its share in the Russian population should grow, and people should be able to provide themselves with housing. In this way, we can resolve the housing issue, which is a serious problem in Russia today.

The same principle works for the demographic problem. Instead of offering $230 a month for a child, as Putin suggests, we need women to feel confident about the future of their children. A woman should know that her children will be able to make a living and provide for their families, achieve decent status in society and support her in her old age. But the sticking point is, once again, that social mobility doesn’t work.

Admittedly, Putin shuns false optimism and says that there can be no progress unless these social problems are resolved. He identifies the defects and talks about the need to fix them. But just as in all his other articles, Putin says very little on how he intends to resolve these problems, and why he hasn’t resolved them earlier.

As before, Vladimir Putin often mentions the 1990s, painting that period almost as the epitome of evil. According to him, all problems started after the economic collapse of the 1990s. But the 1990s in Russia followed the downfall of the Soviet Union, and the problems of the Soviet Union started much earlier. Had the Soviet economy been in order, the Soviet Union would not have collapsed. Of course, by bashing the 1990s, Putin makes the period of his rule look extremely successful, but the plethora of problems he describes raises doubts about that.

Finally, the fundamental problem of Putin’s social policy is that it is focused on social groups that rely on government support. The prime minister still believes in the paternalist model of the state. What’s more, the system he himself has created constantly reproduces this model. Politically, both he and this system are very much interested in increasing the number of such people and decreasing the number of active people. The bigger this creative class that doesn’t need government support, the less stable Putin’s model and, accordingly, his personal political base are.

For a politician who expects to win in the upcoming presidential election and who wants to secure social guarantees for his rule afterwards, Putin’s approach is definitely proper and logical. But for a statesman who thinks about the future of his country, the model he suggests is hardly appropriate.

­Nikolay Svanidze, specially for RT

­The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.