­History provides various examples of how international institutions emerged and developed, but BRIC has no analogues. The witty acronym coined by a Goldman Sachs employee, Jim O'Neill, for commercial interests – namely, to draw clients’ attention to emerging markets – took on a life of its own. The third summit – now in extended format with South Africa as a new full member – showed that this artificially invented list of fast-developing economies, little related to each other, is rapidly transforming into a political reality.

Many Western commentators denounce BRICS as a virtual and mostly Anti-American organization. Others direct their particular criticism against Russia as the economically weakest element in this chain. There is truth in some skeptical statements. The economic crisis exposed a lot of problems in Russia’s dynamism which is far from the numbers shown by the other “letters”.

At the same time Russia has never considered itself a developing country – and, actually, it is not. Brazil, India and China have for several decades now been gradually rising, seeking to overcome (all in their different ways) poverty and backwardness. At the same time, Russia experienced an unprecedented decline 20 years ago, after which it began to rise but has never returned to a stable growth trajectory. Even during the first few years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia did not fall to the level of a third world country. It should be said, though, that the problems faced by Russia were entirely different than those that the other BRICS countries still address, even though these countries may be ahead of Russia in economic growth rates.

The BRIC idea turned up just in time. It was difficult to find a more convenient format for, first, adjusting the general vector of Russia’s foreign policy in favor of non-Western orientation, because the most important strategic arena is rapidly moving from Euro-Atlantic to Asia-Pacific; second, for reminding the world that this country has a global horizon, which was reduced to a regional scale after the Soviet Union’s break-up; and, third, for emphasizing Russia’s commonality with states that are leaders in the rates and quality of economic growth.

However, while finding numerous divergences between the four countries’ views, interests and plans, the critics overlook the main thing – the BRIC countries themselves are obviously interested in developing this format, because they see a potential in it that no other association or forum has. The BRICS format differs from all other acronyms coined according to the same principle in that all participants potentially are not just fast-developing countries but the main “poles” of a multipolar world order. And this is why reducing criteria for the existence of this association of states to economic indicators would mean being guided by an erroneous method for analyzing it.

There are objective reasons why BRIC evokes growing interest.

First, there is a widespread feeling that the global institutional architecture does not meet the real processes taking place in the 21st Century and that the reform of institutions does not go beyond words. One can find many differences in the positions of these four very different countries, but all of them – for their own and usually different reasons – are not satisfied with the current state of affairs in the world and with their position in it. A multipolar world order requires different formats than those that served the bipolar world in the Cold War years and has not changed much since that. It is not accidental that BRIC declarations express doubts about the legitimacy of the existing system.

Second, there is an obvious need for truly new approaches to solving global problems. All the four countries believe that the global discourse has been actually monopolized by the West. This factor not only does not meet the economic or even political alignment of forces, but it also impedes the search for fresh solutions, which can be found only in broad discussions. This is not about confrontation with the West and not even always about competition with it, but about creating an alternative discourse that could enrich the Western one or bypass it without directly conflicting with it.

BRIC countries vote on Libya in the UNSC, when all fours countries abstained, showed the emergence of a consolidated approach. Not anti-Western, but independent. The summit in China just reiterated common willingness to formulate alternative approaches on international institutes, principles of security, understanding of fairness in the world economy and world politics.

Third, all the four countries feel the limitations of their efforts to increase their own weight and influence in international affairs, while acting solely within the framework of existing institutions. In a very different way, of course, because starting points are very different. But one can say that Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are looking for ways to consolidate their negotiating positions in building the future world order.

Fyodor Lukyanov, specially for RT Politics

­The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.