The Treaty envisages that Russia and the United States reduce and limit their strategic offensive arms in such a manner that, seven years after its coming into force and further on, the total amount in possession of each of the sides should not exceed:

(1) 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers;
(2) 1,550 warheads for these; and
(3) 800 deployed and undeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers.

Under the new treaty, the total number of warheads will be reduced by one-third, and the limit for strategic delivery vehicles is less than half the previous limit. Thereby Moscow and Washington have confirmed their leadership in matters of disarmament and clearly demonstrated their commitment to their obligations under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unlike the old treaty on strategic offensive arms (START), the new one allows both parties to independently determine the composition and structure of their strategic offensive forces. Furthermore, the same verification regime will be applied to all strategic offensive weapons, which excludes special verification measures for specific systems. This ensures parity and equality of the sides and also reflects a new level of trust between Moscow and Washington.

The new treaty will apply to all existing strategic offensive arms, both nuclear and conventional.

Conventional, non-nuclear warheads will count towards the limit set for warheads, and their delivery vehicles will count toward the limit for delivery vehicles. This understanding will serve as a foundation for further talks on the effect conventional ICBMs and SLBMs have on strategic stability. This is crucial because we think conventional strategic offensive weapons do destabilize the situation.

The Treaty includes a provision that clearly recognizes a link between strategic offensive arms and missile defense. In other words, it is a legally-binding provision. Besides this, the parties have expressly agreed not to convert or use ICBM and SLBM launchers to deploy interceptor missiles and vice versa. The parties also agreed to discuss features that distinguish interceptor missiles from ICBMs and SLBMs, and interceptor missiles launchers from ICBM and SLBM launchers. We are convinced that these measures will increase the transparency of strategic missile defense programs.

It has been noted that the treaty is being signed considering the levels of strategic defense systems currently at disposal of the parties. Changes in such levels give either party the right to decide on its further participation in the strategic arms reduction process. The Russian Federation, in particular, will have the right to withdraw from the treaty if quantitative and qualitative growth of the US strategic missile defense system begins to have a significant effect on the efficiency of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Of course, it is up to us to determine the degree of such effect. This will be expressly stipulated in a statement of the Russian Federation included with the set of documents, and this position of the Russian Federation will be acknowledged in the response statement by the United States.

In general, the new treaty signifies the transition to a new level of co-operation between the Russian Federation and the United States in disarmament and non-proliferation and lays the groundwork for new co-operation in the military-strategic field and in matters of ensuring mutual and global security. The treaty gives extra opportunities to strengthen the bilateral partnership between Russia and the US.

Let me point out that this treaty is based on the principle of total parity, both in its spirit and letter. Parity is ensured in all its components, from its base philosophy to parameters and verification procedures.

We believe it is very important to move towards the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons—and this will be recorded in the Treaty, in its preamble. But it is also clear that we cannot move towards this goal in a vacuum, turning a blind eye to everything that is going on in the area of security. We believe that in order to talk seriously about practical steps towards a world without nuclear weapons, it is necessary to take notice of a number of factors that could potentially upset global strategic stability. These include, first and foremost, the prospect of weapons being deployed in outer space. You know that Russia and China have jointly put forward an initiative to sign an international treaty that would ban deploying weapons in outer space. So far, not all countries have supported this initiative. Another factor likely to have an equally destabilizing impact on the global situation is conventional strategic offensive arms.

As regards the Treaty’s importance for progress towards a nuclear-free world, this is no doubt a very important step in this direction, a step that creates conditions for other states with nuclear arsenals to join the process at the next stage, and I am sure that this subject will be discussed.

And, third, in order to progress towards a nuclear-free world, as I said today, it is necessary to deal with the issue of conventional strategic offensive arms and conventional strategic arms in general. The United States is actively developing such systems. This is a serious issue that affects the overall global strategic stability. When we say that nuclear weapons are better destroyed, it is not because we don’t like specifically nuclear weapons; it is because we don’t like to see on Earth any weapons that might destabilize the global situation. This is what we will be talking about at later stages, I am sure.

Ideally, it would be right to start with a joint evaluation of threats. It is only later, after we come to a common view on what these threats are and where they come from, that we should take steps to neutralize them. I can only speak for the Russian side, and the Russian side is absolutely sure that the Treaty that we will sign and put up for ratification deserves to come into force. It secures Russia’s national interests; it secures those interests while not impinging on US national interests; it reflects a balance of the two powers’ interests, and this Treaty, most importantly, makes a substantial contribution to the strengthening of global stability. This is why we have nothing to be ashamed of. We are ready to discuss all these arguments with our parliamentarians in detail, and I am sure that the American side has every reason to do the same and defend this Treaty in the Senate.

I don’t even want to speculate about using the right to withdraw from the Treaty. We have commented on the situation with both Bulgaria and Romania. We believe that in a situation where direct consultations, a direct dialogue, between Russian and American experts on missile defense are in progress in line with instructions from the Russia and US presidents, these sorts of surprises are best avoided. Ideally, as I said, we would do well jointly to begin analyzing threats, and it is only later, after we come to a joint understanding of those threats, that we will be able to decide what steps are necessary, including the issue of what facilities and where need to be created. Incidentally, we have always suggested that this work should directly involve European countries rather than being a strictly Russia-US affair. And I still hope we can work in this way. Let me note that the Treaty to be signed in Prague says that strategic offensive arms should be deployed solely in the territory of the country which they belong to. Of course, there is also another type of weapons, tactical weapons, and as regards these weapons here, many of the US tactical weapons, for instance, are not in its territory. European countries have been raising this question and discussing it actively of late, and I think they have every reason to do so.

In a number of its parameters, it [the old START Treaty] was lopsided and discriminatory towards our country. All these elements have been deleted from the new Treaty. The Treaty that is to be signed in Prague the day after tomorrow secures full parity.