Question: When does a defensive missile system become offensive?
Published: 26 March, 2010, 15:35
Edited: 28 April, 2010, 13:46
Answer: When offensive missiles are no longer capable of penetrating the defensive, anti-missile system.
Lets not BS about this XXX this missile defense is about a first nuke strike on Russia when the times comes that the Americans are confident they can repeal a second strike capability/revenge attack from Russia. It is truly that simple. God help us all on that day.
The point of American ABM's as part of an offensive strategy is to use them after a first American strike using ICBM's. The ABM's are to be used to intercept a retaliatory Russian launch of its ICBM's. For this strategy to be successful it is not enough to have ABM's but to have them around after your surprise attack. This is extremely unlikely to be the case for any American ABM's based in Europe. Short range nuclear tipped Russian missiles(not covered by the new treaty) will have wiped them out before their retaliatory nuclear strike is launched. And if the ABM's are based in America they will have to intercept any ICBM's long after their launch. And as these missiles will change there position randomly in flight and will be surrounded by decoy dummy warheads this will be an extremely difficult task. And it is these considerations ,among others, that have made the new treaty possible.
Among a host of other issues, there are several troubling and difficult issues on which both the American and Russian governments owe some explanation to humanity: 1. The whole notion of "strategic arms" versus tactical arms is Cold War dinosaur. New technologies and the changing postures, especially of the US and NATO, are making the distinction obsolete and gravely inadequate. Already some 40 years, the US went ahead with the production of aircraft that are smaller and nimbler than bigger strategic bombers; but these are also capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. And the number of these aircraft succeeds many time the number of the traditional strategic triad. 2. The new START regime is taking place right at the place when the US is about to create an uninterrupted ring of defensive/offensive missiles right by the borders of Russia--imagine a continuous rings of "Cubas of 1961" along the whole eastern side of the US except that this "1961-Cubanization" (back then in response to the US missile deployment in Turkey) seems to be now becoming the new strategic reality Russia and, moreover, with a difference that the missiles now are much faster, more numerous, much more precise, and also much more mobile. And this does not even include the already mentioned "tactical" air force. As, so paradoxically, while the new strategic arms reduction treaty is being heralded, Defense Secretary Gates, as the article points out, is quick to say that this "reduction" would actually mean a significant rise in U.S. military expenditures for "modernizing nuclear weapons." A bizarre world where "reduction" is intended to mean actually more and not less.
Simple response: deliver the S-300 missiles to Iran. Better yet, give them S-400 missiles. Do the same for Venezuela. See how the United States reacts.
It becomes offensive when state which owns this system starts building it outside it's own territory. Secondly, any military system in hands of USA has been always offensive.
Encircled by missles, being flooded with heroin.Chechen rebels setting a bad example. How is a recovering superpower to respond toAmerican aggresion? How about if you don't respond and submit. You Russians are sturdy folk. You make excellent hewers of wood and drawers of water. Madeleine Albright warned you that the natural wealth of Siberia is far too much for only one country to posess. Isn't a warning enough.? Why not put aside your silly notions of indpendence and maybe the Americans will let you keep a less noxious/aromatic version of a "Russian". Why are you resisting the inevitable American Empire? Don't you want to be a part of something bigger than your retarded midget thousand year existence?
I asume that thousands of years of military practices (ie when faced by a well equipped and strong enemy you ensure that you are better equipped and stronger in order to deter them / defeat them) have suddenly become wrong? If it is not wrong, then why is Russia reducing its advantage and weakening itself by reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile? I hope that Russian military planners have some method in their madness, because to weaken yourself in front of a strong and agressive enemy is to invite attack or at least domination.
Anybody who has ever read history knows that western "civilization" can NOT be trusted, American dream is to rob and enslave. Time is showing that WW2 was war between Anglo and German Nazis, the Germans have accepted and tolerate their leadership, Russian people unfortunately paid the heaviest price. War against Russia hasn't stopped, it is done by only mean possible, SLOWLY bleeding Russia to a point where they feel they can deliver final blow. Hope the military leadership is aware of this.
I think all this complaining and analyzing is a show of weakness from the Russian side. Reality seams to be that Russia is unable to counter the US on their military agenda, which has always been and always will be aggressive. Russia is not giving Venezuela S-400 because is politically not able to do it. For the US to have a stable EU is not economically positive. The more instability the better for them. And they probably learned from Napoleon and the Nazi: if you want to take Russia you must attack from all sides at once. So we go and the "new" eastern EU countries are just what they needed. Kosovo has the largest EU military base. And, most of all, the EU in unable to have a unique voice and counter this trend; we have to humbly accept it, like it or not. For everyone interest, at least in the EU, I hope Russia will be able to negotiate from a higher stand, but at the moment it does not look like it. And it makes me sad Luca
March 26, 2010, 19:45, Babeouf wrote > The point of American ABM's as part of an offensive strategy is to use them after a first American strike using ICBM's." Not necessarily. The so-called "ABM's" are more likely the first strike force--simply because on account of their proximity to the target area, which gives them a radical advantage over "strategic," long range/long distance weapons that need more time to travel, thus also giving more time to the defense. Not so in the case of the "ABMs." The new treaty would allow the US to have a significantly reduced number of targets and Russia's second/retaliatory strike capability, while dramatically increasing its first strike force. Furthermore, despite the non-binding Russian unilateral declaration about the ABMs in the preamble, the US is clearly intended to use the treaty as a legitimization and agreement--international and Russian O.K.--for its radical and unprecedented decision to deploy its first strike force right by the whole western parameter of the Russian Federation in the guise of defense and piecemeal, gradual installment. It is a strategy of selling bad news by small bits, each of which might seem to look innocent or not that bad in order to preempt opposition. In other words, the new treaty is really about pushing with the new diabolical first strike force "under the radars" of the public (and Russia--both symbolically and literally), while covering it with a Russian consent and international law.
In the new treaty, Russia is "reserving the right to withdraw from the treaty if it deemed American missile defenses a threat." But this rings a bit hollow for, should this happen, the act of withdrawing would be viewed as an act of the treaty abrogation, thus putting Russia in a negative light and thus shifting the blame from the US on Russia. Moreover, at that point, it would be much harder to convince the public that what does not seem to be recognized as a threat now would have become a threat later. Yet, the bottom line is simple a weapon is a weapon, and the "ABMs" means just that--putting more weapons right under Russia's nose. 1) The Russians should have insisted on expanding monitoring to include the ABMs 2) Instead of the current toothless unilateral nonbinding Russian declaration ("reserving the right to withdraw from the treaty if it deemed American missile defenses a threat"), the text should have been much more specific--clearly stating which technical parameters or characteristics of the US ABMS would AUTOMATICALLY make the treaty null and void. I thought that the Russians are better at playing chess.
If your opponent has a shield, you have the option to get a shield also. You are not restricted to the choices of getting more deft at wielding your offensive weapons, or getting better offensive weapons. Beside the US and Russia, there are also a dozen of other countries that could use the nuclear weapons as well. Not having a shield is practically committing suicide.
"Presently, this is the quandary in which Russia now finds itself:" Not presently, but possibly in the future. So long as MAD holds, and it will in the mid-term, neither side has any true advantage over the other. Furthermore, if nuclear winter theory is true then Russia could achieve MAD by detonating its arsenal within its own territory. None of this is to say there is no threat of an imbalance, though as of yet the salient technologies have unknown potential, but this threat is not immediate. "All said, the best that the world can hope for from America’s ongoing missile defense plans – which, incidentally, are designed to offset hypothetical, unproven threats from Iran or North Korea" North Korea is not a true nuclear threat yet, but since it already has nuclear weapons and is clearly and consistently trying to building long-range delivery capacity it would be unreasonable to demand the US and its allies not to be prepared for NK missile strikes. Iran is hazier, but it is consistently trying to increase the range of its missiles, computer hacking has uncovered conclusive evidence that it used to have a weaponization program, and its civilian nuclear program would put it a stone throw away from successful weaponization. Likewise, fate favors the prepared. "– is for the American side to co-operate with Russia in all stages of operation of such technologies." Definitely.
Rasmussen did note "many Europeans question the need for such a missile defense system," but the European common sense is to be put at rest by repeating the old claim that this whole continental system is allegedly "aimed at deterring Iran." Iran? In the same article, R. Nicholas Burns, a former senior American official and ambassador to NATO, now a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government., actually explains: “We heard a lot of platitudes … [but] after Sept. 11, 2001 with Europe enlarged and the Balkan wars over, U.S. vital interests shifted to the Middle East, Afghanistan, China and Iran. We shifted eastward and Europe didn’t. Europe should be our natural ally, if we can get together on the Middle East, Russia and China.” “Getting on the Middle East” has already resulted in two wars—one of them clearly fought under false pretenses, and the other one possibly so as well. So, in a nutshell, in reality, as Nicholas Burns says, the new missile system is how to get on Russia and further on China—in the continuous “getting eastward,” which does sound almost too much like the old Drank nach Osten.
March 27, 2010, 11:19, Bob wrote > I asume that thousands of years of military practices (ie when faced by a well equipped and strong enemy you ensure that you are better equipped and stronger in order to deter them / defeat them) have suddenly become wrong? > If it is not wrong, then why is Russia reducing its advantage and weakening itself by reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile? > I hope that Russian military planners have some method in their madness, because to weaken yourself in front of a strong and agressive enemy is to invite attack or at least domination. The reason the russians are reducing their stockpile is because the US will do the same. But both countries will still posses enough weapons to destroy the world over. So the MAD doctrine is still in good standing. You can sleep tightly you can still be killed by a nuclear exchange.
ABM IS a defensive weapon to intercept a limited launch from a country with a small number of ballistic missiles like Iran, Syria, or North Korea. The ABM system will be easily overwhelmed by a massive launch from Russia, if not destroyed 1st by a well placed number of IRBMs from Russia in case of a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia. The ABM does not carry any form of explosive payload, it destroy its target by direct kinetic hit. One problem of a 1st nuclear strike is that the country in the receiving end of the strike will see them coming, which in that case will have no choice but to launch theirs, probably in proportion to our attack, and if necessary escalating. Seems some have forgotten about the ballistic missile nuclear submarines, which can be stationed near the coast of the adversary country. Ergo will be even harder for the ABM system to intercept because submarines can be anywhere in the sea and launch their missiles close to the target country.










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