The seven-hour visit to Kiev by Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week turned out to be an anti-climactic event. The euphoric build-up by India’s corporate media was unprecedented — perhaps, taking their cue from American diplomats in Delhi who saw an opportunity to create public misperceptions regarding Russia.
Viewed from Delhi, the Ukraine question has transformed into the objective correlative of the US-India relationship. Which is no small matter, of course. The entire fifth column of the US lobby in India came out of the woodwork in a vicious media campaign to characterise Modi’s Kiev visit as marking a turnaround from the delicately worked out positive neutrality that his government adopted towards Russia's Ukraine war.
India’s policy is a mixture of objectivity and creativity laced with self-interests. Its vectors are: national interest; principles of international law and the UN Charter; non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; indivisibility of inter-state security between neighbours; national self-determination; peaceful co-existence; balance of power, etc.
The hustlers of the entrenched American lobby in India have begun recklessly tampering with the delicately constructed architecture of the country’s Ukraine policy, risking the erosion of India’s strategic autonomy. India’s positive neutrality vis-a-vis the Ukraine war needs to be properly understood.
For a start, India would have profound difficulty with Russia’s infraction of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but is also not unaware that Ukraine is de facto an American proxy which has forfeited its sovereignty. According to US media reports, there are about 2-3 dozen CIA stations operating on the 1974-km long Ukraine-Russia border. India, a large country, which is bigger than all the seven or eight small countries surrounding it combined, can very well understand how the dynamics of indivisibility of inter-state security play out in such complicated settings.
However, the bottom line lies somewhere else: although self-determination is a cardinal principle in modern international law, India has not recognised it and it is unlikely it ever will.
Equally, Modi keeps repeating that this is not an era for wars. Russia’s special military operation of February 2022 was precipitated by the US and NATO who refused to negotiate with Moscow, given the agenda to entrap it in a quagmire through a proxy war and bleed it white until it collapses in sheer exhaustion, as had happened to the former Soviet Union.
Moscow’s intention, nonetheless, was modest originally — cajole the regime in Kiev to come to the negotiating table. A peace deal was actually negotiated (and initialled) in March 2022 by Russian and Ukrainian negotiators in Istanbul under Turkish mediation. But, alas, Anglo-American pressure on Kiev instead compelled it to seek a military option with NATO support.
Suffice to say, the western hypocrisy in pillorying Russia as “invader” and piling sanctions upon it is all too apparent. India was a silent spectator but it has imbibed some valuable lessons out of the West’s diplomatic skulduggery. Thus, condemning Russia doesn’t come easy to India and nor to the majority of the Global South who can grasp the raison d’être of the US-backed colour revolution — Russia calls it a coup — in Kiev in 2014.
On the other hand, Delhi also knows that the US and its allies are virtually fighting a war against Russia. Apart from fuelling the war by supplying weapons, western mercenaries and military advisors are fighting in Ukraine and NATO countries are known to collect intelligence and plan and execute military attacks on Russia under the Ukrainian flag.
The various statements during Modi’s visit to Kiev on Friday and the joint statement issued at the end of the visit taken together — and subsequent press briefings by Indian officials — underscored that there is no sign of a shift in India’s neutral policy pursued since 2022. A close perusal of the joint statement shows that Modi has not endorsed Zelensky’s so-called Peace Framework “as a basis for further efforts to promote just peace based on dialogue, diplomacy, and international law.”
Most importantly, the crucial para 11 of the joint statement says: “Prime Minister Modi reiterated the need for sincere and practical engagement between all stakeholders to develop innovative solutions that will have broad acceptability and contribute towards early restoration of peace”. [Emphasis added.]
The carefully-worded formulation is applicable not only to Ukraine and Russia but also to the Western powers and NATO. The catch phrases “sincere and practical engagement” imply that the Western countries must also stop fuelling the war; “innovative solutions” would mean, inter alia, that territorial concessions may become necessary; and, “broad acceptability” empathizes with Russia’s legitimate concerns over Ukraine’s NATO membership.
Interestingly, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar proposed in Kiev that Zelensky should consider various other avenues of reaching a peace agreement with Russia besides his idea of a “peace summit”. To quote Jaishankar, “It is the view, not just of India but certainly of India as well, that there could be multiple ways of approaching this issue” of peace talks.
In its totality, in this carefully crafted balancing act, Modi has apparently ruled out the role of India as a mediator, although it is entirely conceivable that he is open to acting as a go-between with the warring parties. At any rate, the war is showing no signs of abating; on the contrary, it is only intensifying. The “unknown unknown” is whether Modi had discussed Delhi’s role in his conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his July visit to Moscow.
The outcome of Modi’s visit to Kiev shows that India’s relationship with Russia is an absolute ‘no-go’ area for both Washington and Kiev. So, the historically warm relations with Russia will continue — in particular, defence cooperation (Russian weaponry accounts for more than half of India’s inventory) and purchase of Russian oil (which currently amounts to 40% of India’s total imports of oil.) Bilateral trade is booming and stood at $64 billion in the past financial year (as compared to $3 billion with Ukraine).
It comes as no surprise that Kiev's expectations of a shift in the Indian stance have been dashed. The disappointment and rancour probably found expression in Zelensky’s media outburst later on Friday. He tends to be boorish towards interlocutors who do not bandwagon with him.
To be sure, Delhi took notes, as evidenced by a post on X by India’s former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal, where he wrote that Zelensky’s statements to the media after Modi left Kiev represent “entitlement politics and dictating policy to India” as the Ukrainian leader suggested he wanted India on his side and “not balancing between us and Russia”. “Modi went to Ukraine with the best of intentions,” Sibal noted.
How did this mishap occur? The lobbyists in Delhi hyped up Modi’s visit out of all proportions. A well-known pundit even conjured from thin air a far-fetched thesis that Modi’s visit signified an Indian “push” into Eastern / Central Europe “disentangling New Delhi’s engagement with the region from its relationship with Russia.”
When such baloney passes off as strategic discourse, the signalling system goes haywire and a train crash occurs inevitably. Zelensky told reporters he hopes to visit India to connect with the people directly. He probably senses he has a lobby in Delhi.
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.