This week’s presidential election was a landmark for the United States. Donald Trump’s impressive victory means, at first glance, that on the main issues of concern to the American electorate – the economy and immigration – citizens found his positions more convincing than those proposed by Vice President Kamala Harris. In addition, it’s clear that Americans, when choosing a head of state, preferred an obviously stronger personality.
Furthermore, Trump’s imminent return to the White House means the failure of the Democratic Party’s enormous propaganda effort to portray the Republican as a criminal, a fascist, and an agent of the Kremlin.
What’s more, Trump’s victory is a major blow to the left-liberal agenda of the globalist forces of the political West as a whole. Right-wing nationalist forces in Europe – whether in government (Hungary) or opposition (France, Germany) – have gained a powerful ally. This is certainly not the end of liberal globalism, but at least a temporary forced rollback. As for the notorious deep state, having failed to prevent Trump’s election victory, it will now have to try strangle him in its embrace. The US is entering a period of political uncertainty, but at the same time, the undeniable nature of Trump’s triumph dramatically reduces the likelihood of street riots and mass violence.
It’s also a fact that the transfer of the White House and at least one chamber of Congress (the Senate) to Republican control will mean a hardening of Washington’s foreign policy towards US allies. The trend of shifting the burden of military and financial expenditures in support of ‘free world interests’ from the US to its associates dates back to Trump’s first four-year term and has not been interrupted under Joe Biden. Despite Atlanticist fears, NATO is unlikely to be abolished, but the bloc will cost Western Europeans significantly more. Asian allies will also be asked to invest more in the confrontation with China, which also began under Trump-45 and will intensify under 47. In the Middle East, on the other hand, the US will be more active and open in its support for Israel, no longer cloaking this support with selective criticism.
The countries that the US sees as a source of threat to its position as the global hegemon will be subject to pressure from the Trump administration. This applies first and foremost to China and Iran. Beijing will face increased opposition from Washington to China’s economic and especially technological development, as well as to the strengthening of the American system of military and political alliances. Washington will more actively force its European allies – against their interests and wishes – to join the campaign of economic pressure on China. Iran will also come under increased hostility, both directly and through increased support for Israel.
Trump is known for his statements about the threat of World War III and his promise to end the Ukraine conflict “in 24 hours.” Recognizing the danger of the current indirect conflict between the West and Russia escalating into a direct clash is a positive element of Trump’s campaign rhetoric. The Biden-Harris administration’s policy of escalating the fighting led to the threat of nuclear war. As for the promise to end the Ukraine conflict, it should be understood, firstly, that it will not be possible to do so ‘in 24 hours’, and secondly, that ‘ending the war’ does not mean ‘stopping the fighting’, but solving the problems that led to it.
Talking about a cessation of hostilities along the existing line of contact is unlikely to be taken seriously in Moscow. This scenario would be nothing more than a pause, after which the conflict would flare up with renewed vigor and probably greater intensity. The nature of the future Ukrainian regime, its military and military-economic potential, and Kiev’s military-political status are of paramount importance to Russia. In addition, new territorial realities have to be taken into account.
It will be difficult to expect the new Trump administration to agree to substantive dialogue on these issues, let alone to take Moscow’s core interests into account. If it is willing, dialogue will begin, but even then, agreement is far from guaranteed. A separate issue is what can be regarded as satisfactory guarantees in conditions where both sides do not trust each other at all. The two Minsk agreements (of 2014 and 2015) have been violated, and the third attempt – Istanbul 2022 – was thwarted, so a fourth is unlikely.
The only guarantee Russia can rely on is a guarantee to itself. The good news for now is that Trump says he wants to cut military aid to Ukraine. Despite the likely partial offsetting of this with extra Western European support for Kiev, if it happens, it will bring peace closer.
This article was first published by the newspaper Kommersant and was translated and edited by the RT team.