As an observer state since 2005, Iran's ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are on the up, in the light of President Hassan Rouhani's first international trip to Bishkek's SCO summit.
As a leading Persian Gulf power that simultaneously serves
a vital bridge connecting the landlocked Central Asian states to
the open sea, Iran's SCO connection serves both its national
security interests as well as the mutual interests of SCO member states.
Utilizing the SCO's diplomatic forum, which was held this Friday, for discussing various regional and "out of area" international issues such as the Syrian crisis, President Rouhani has had meetings with the Chinese, Russian, and Central Asian leaders - on the summit's sidelines, aimed at enhancing Iran's regional portfolio, and bolstering trade and commercial relations with the SCO family.
From Tehran's vantage point, SCO is a dual purpose security and
economic regional organization that is destined to play a
prominent role with respect to the sensitive stability issues,
such as the Afghanistan peace co-partnership in the aftermath of
the US and NATO's planned departure in 2014.
Having accepted Afghanistan as an observer state, the SCO is
concerned about the multiple threats of spill-over in ethnic
violence and extremism emanating from Afghanistan and, given
Iran's long borders with Afghanistan and traditional influence in
Kabul, it is all the more important to pursue a coordinated, even
collective, regional effort within the SCO framework to address
the challenges stemming from a "post-US"
Afghanistan.
Of course, there are other important reasons why Iran is
genuinely interested in the SCO. The SCO's connection confers
regional status and influence and thus serves Iran's "new
regionalism" approach spearheaded by President Rouhani and
the resourceful Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who has an
excellent track record with respect to international mediation on
Afghanistan. In the past, Iran has played a constructive role in
conflict-mediation - in Nagorno Karabakh, Tajikistan - and can
certainly continue to do so, e.g., with respect to mediating the
territorial disputes between the Central Asian members of
SCO.
On the economic front, Iran is planning to strengthen its
presence at the SCO Business Council and to stimulate SCO member
states' interest in trade and investment opportunities in Iran,
especially in the energy sector, which is why Tehran has endorsed
Moscow's pitch for an SCO energy committee. Given the SCO region's growing"pipeline
politics" and the energy security issues that are inherently
connected to the stability issues Iran views itself as a
"stability provider" and simultaneously as a viable
conduit for the region's energy and other, e.g., regional
transportation, priorities.
With respect to the nuclear standoff, which has resulted in the
SCO's decision to put on hold Iran's quest for membership, the
SCO by virtue of encompassing two UN Security Council veto
powers, i.e., Russia and China, is poised to contribute to the
on-going negotiations to resolve the Iran nuclear crisis.
Since this crisis has a security component, Iran's growing links
with the SCO in fact serve a dynamic role in terms of offsetting
the military threats against Iran and providing a further
security cushion for Iran, which will undoubtedly decrease Iran's
national security concerns.
Unlike other observer states such as India and Pakistan, or SCO 'dialogue partners' such as Turkey and Belarus, Iran's SCO membership would not complicate the delicate inter-SCO dynamics, such as Sino-Russian cooperation.
Rather, given Iran's Persian Gulf status, purely non-aligned orientation and foreign policy doctrine of "equi-distance" from superpowers, Iran's membership offers multiple advantages to the SCO - that outweigh the expressed SCO concerns, such as with respect to the nuclear standoff. Therefore, a "conditional acceptance" of Iran that is tied in with Iran's enhanced cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and successful multilateral negotiations is worth exploring.
Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Ph.D., expert on Iran's Foreign
Affairs
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.