Kursk attack: This is why Zelensky felt emboldened
To understand the situation with Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk Region, we need to consider that beyond the heavily fortified front lines where intense fighting has been ongoing for three years, the two states share over 1,000 kilometers of internationally recognized border. Most of this stretch is relatively peaceful, with low troop density on both sides – mostly border guards and reinforced security – and regular economic activity continues.
On August 6, reports emerged of Ukrainian forces entering Kursk near the town of Sudzha. Initially, this seemed like another routine border skirmish. However, by the end of the first day, it was clear that something bigger was unfolding – there were no staged TikTok videos or mass disinformation, and Kiev remained silent for two days, with Ukrainian Telegram channels primarily reposting Russian sources.
The first official statement from Kiev came on the morning of August 8. Mikhail Podoliak, an adviser to the Ukrainian president’s office, confirmed that regular troops had entered Kursk Region. By then, Russian reinforcements had been deployed to Sudzha, starting with special forces teams to eliminate isolated enemy groups, followed by regular units to bolster the area.
By August 8, the crisis was contained. Ukraine could not establish a continuous front line in Kursk Region, Sudzha was not captured, and barring any surprises, we can expect a tedious cleanup operation to remove Ukrainian forces while sporadic raids across the border continue.
The Ukrainian strategy resembled the 2022 autumn offensive in Kharkov Region: Create a numerical advantage in a narrow sector, penetrate enemy territory with light armored vehicles, spread quickly, and force defensive positions to retreat without a fight.
Western sources have provided insight into the scale of the operation. According to The Times, 6,000 to 10,000 Ukrainian troops are involved. Forbes has identified participating units, including the 22nd and 88th Mechanized Brigades and the 80th Air Assault Brigade, which it describes as one of Ukraine’s most elite and agile groupings.
Other information revealed that around 1,000 to 1,500 Ukrainian soldiers, several dozen armored vehicles, and a few tanks initially crossed into Russia, supported by artillery fire from the Ukrainian side of the border, heavily shelling Sudzha just 10km away.
These numbers align with Western reports. In military terms, the spearhead of an assault usually constitutes 15-20% of the total force, with the rest following up, securing flanks, and providing logistics, artillery support, and drone operations. Since the advance failed, most Ukrainian troops remain in Sumy Region, continuing cross-border incursions.
Notably, throughout all the turmoil, the Sudzha gas station continued (and continues) to operate, facilitating the flow from Russia through Ukraine to Europe.
Why did it happen?
Western media is rife with speculation about why Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky is pursuing this path. Seizing a relatively unknown district center hardly seems worth depleting the most combat-ready units of the Ukrainian Army. The main action is happening in Donbass, where the Russian Army, although advancing slowly, appears unstoppable and where fresh, eager Ukrainian brigades are desperately needed.
Last summer’s experiences demonstrated that Ukraine’s ability to break through the front line is significantly inferior to that of the Russian military. The Azov Sea operation (the ill-fated counteroffensive) ended in failure, and now all the Ukrainian Army can do is retreat, plugging gaps in its defenses here and there.
This scenario spells defeat and, consequently, the downfall of Zelensky’s regime. In the West, it’s become commonplace to suggest that Ukraine must come to terms with losing territory and essentially accept defeat.
Kiev is scrambling for creative solutions to reverse these trends. The Ukrainian Army does have some precedents, notably the Kharkov operation in the autumn of 2022. Alongside Kherson, this was one of Kiev’s only genuine military successes. It seems logical to try to replicate it, which requires finding suitable conditions on the battlefield. However, these are absent at the front (with dense infantry presence everywhere), making breakthroughs by light, mobile units impossible.
Now we arrive at the intriguing part. The relative calm along the 1,000-kilometer border for two and a half years likely wasn’t coincidental. We can suggest there were agreements between Moscow and Washington, specifically with the administration of US President Joe Biden. The White House openly opposed Ukrainian actions on territory recognized by the West as part of Russia (which includes the border areas we’re discussing).
Thus, numerous incursions across the shared border into Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk regions were conducted under false flags by specially created entities such as the ‘Russian Volunteer Corps’, the ‘Legion of Freedom for Russia’, and other neo-Nazi groups.
Kiev repeatedly tried to bypass the West’s red lines by any means necessary, arguing there is no need to fear escalation since Russia has limited capacity for retaliation, and so on.
With a change in the White House, Kiev sees an opportunity. Leaks indicate that Kiev’s representatives have been communicating with advisers to Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris rather than Biden for some time now. This presents a convenient moment to raise the stakes and confront the new team with a fait accompli: Look, we can successfully advance on Russian territory; it’s in your interest to support us.
Even partial success, securing just one city, would allow Kiev to demand more from Washington, then even more. It doesn’t matter that Russia will inevitably respond by fortifying its defenses here too. The media impact, as Kiev envisions, will last as long as the front line cuts through what is canonically Russian territory. Even a zero-sum result, if the raid has to be aborted, can be spun as a victory.
From Kiev’s perspective, such a gamble is worth the combat-ready brigades that would otherwise be lost ingloriously in yet another obscure Donetsk village. There’s more logic here than in the six-month bloodbath in Krynki (with over 1,000 casualties) or in the countless failed attempts to land a flag in Crimea or on sandy spits at the mouth of the Dnieper.
What will the Kremlin’s response be?
The second aim of the attempted incursion into Kursk Region is to stir discontent within Russia, portraying President Vladimir Putin as weak and provoking rash decisions.
What is at stake here? It’s well known that the conflict between Moscow and Kiev has devolved into a war of attrition. The key to victory is to deplete at a slower rate than your adversary. Which town or city is under control doesn’t matter much; everything will be decided by who exhausts their resources first.
After bouncing back from initial setbacks, Russia has embedded the conflict into its national economy. With expenditures of around 7% of GDP, the country can sustain the fight for a long time. Yes, it faces recruitment challenges, but they are far less severe than Ukraine’s, where willing soldiers ran out over a year ago.
As mentioned earlier, this trajectory will lead to collapse for Ukraine, making Kiev’s desperation to disrupt the Kremlin’s game understandable. From the Russian leadership’s perspective, sticking to its ‘special military operation’ strategy means it shouldn’t focus too heavily on events in Kursk to avoid playing into Kiev’s hands.
However, it’s not that simple. Moscow can’t ignore enemy actions. It’s not just about politically legitimizing what was previously unacceptable, as we’ve discussed. It’s about the raid on Sudzha forcing the Russian General Staff to reconsider the security of the 1,000km of shared border with Ukraine, anticipating that similar events could happen anywhere along it.
Under the Kremlin’s strategy, there is no clear-cut response to such a bold raid – the answer since February 2022 involves using all available resources while avoiding general mobilization or self-depletion. Moscow does not have another army ready and standing by to occupy newly vulnerable border areas.
What’s next?
There are three potential scenarios for the developments in Kursk Region.
First: Russia could prepare a task force to carry out its own cross-border operation, either by opening a full-fledged second front (possibly targeting Sumy) or establishing a buffer zone similar to the one in Kharkov. This would be Moscow’s most aggressive response options. It secures not only Kursk and neighboring regions but also provides a clear and direct answer to the Ukrainian raid.
But without additional mobilization, Moscow might lack the strength for a second front. Maintaining a narrow border strip with a dense front line requires a sizable force, which might be needed elsewhere.
Second: Kiev might have several fresh, well-trained, and equipped brigades ready to launch a new offensive on other Russian border regions or break through an existing front line. This would force Moscow to scale back or significantly slow down its operations in Donbass, reallocating troops from there. The political objectives mentioned earlier would be achieved.
However, there is no clear evidence that Kiev has such forces. Western sources indicate that the three brigades involved in the recent raid are all of Ukraine’s combat-ready reserves not engaged at the front. Even if this is not correct, Russia still holds a numerical advantage, the element of surprise is lost, and thus the chances of success for another attempt are lower.
Finally, the third scenario, which seems most likely given the Kremlin’s rhetoric: Neutralize Kiev’s actions with available resources, clear the border area of Ukrainian sabotage units, and prevent breakthroughs elsewhere. This allows Russia to continue its strategy, which Moscow believes is the most beneficial.
In this case, the border region will become another active combat zone, and the lack of decisive retribution allows Kiev to claim a shift in red lines and at least partial success. Russian relying on limited forces and refusing to withdraw large numbers from the Donetsk theater would mean the operation to secure the Kursk borderlands could drag on.
We will soon see which scenario unfolds.
