Here’s the issue behind Russia’s Ukraine position that West still doesn’t get
Joe Biden is expected to make some new decisions regarding Ukraine in the weeks leading up to the country’s November elections. The US president was supposed to attend an important meeting of Kiev’s backers in Ramstein, Germany, on October 12 but canceled, citing the need to stay at home due to Hurricane Milton.
What decisions can we expect to be made when it eventually takes place? Most likely, nothing particularly important will happen – here’s why.
A unified stance
Amidst the fog of propaganda, it can be hard to discern true motives, and often these only become clear over time.
After the start of Russia’s military operation in February 2022, Western media presented a unified and convincing narrative: the entire so-called “free world” came together to defend Ukraine, determined to deliver a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin and restore the US-led global order. However, these proclamations didn’t match the steps taken by the West. After all, if your goal is to defeat an opponent, shouldn’t you do everything in your power to achieve it?
If the West was counting on a Ukrainian military triumph, it should have provided as much military aid to Kiev as possible. The first step would have been to open up full access to Western weapons arsenals; the second would have been to accept the country into NATO and turn it into a key stronghold on the border with Russia. Even if Putin would have done everything to stop this, such a step would automatically signify his defeat, since even a nuclear strike wouldn’t be able to change the situation and reverse the West’s decision.
Historical examples clearly illustrate this point. For instance, after withdrawing its troops, the West provided South Vietnam with nearly 3,000 aircraft and helicopters, 200 ships, over 2,500 combat boats, more than 1,000 tanks, up to 2,500 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, and around 100,000 heavy vehicles, along with other equipment. Compare this to the situation in Ukraine, where receiving a dozen outdated fighter jets or two dozen old tanks is a major event.
Let’s take another example. In the aftermath of WWII, and during the Cold War, Türkiye became a key strategic region. Then-Soviet leader Joseph Stalin demanded the country’s neutrality and even sought to establish a Soviet naval base in the area of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. The USSR’s former allies, the US and UK, could not allow a Soviet military facility in the Mediterranean Sea, so Türkiye was accepted into NATO just three years after the alliance was formed, despite the fact that the country had nothing to do with the North Atlantic region or ‘Western democracies.’ At the time, the Truman Doctrine was in effect and the US was offering a security umbrella to anyone ‘under threat’ from communism.
Biden’s doctrine
Why are things different now? The doctrinal principle that has shaped the West’s policy on Ukraine since 2014 is to prevent Putin from achieving his goals and do it without engaging in a direct military conflict with Russia.
Biden and his administration have consistently stated that their priority is to avoid a full on confrontation with Russia, yet this message has largely been forgotten.
How does this principle align with what we have today – the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War Two, in which the West is fighting Russia by means of the Ukrainian army? Sure, it may not be on the same scale as Vietnam, but the military aid provided to Kiev is still significant.
The answer is simple: the decision-makers in the West – often referred to as the globalists – never truly believed that Ukraine could defeat Russia on the battlefield (Well, let’s say almost never; there was one notable exception, which we’ll discuss later).
Biden’s doctrine implied that the West could achieve its goals through financial and trade strategies. Recognizing that an armed conflict was looming, the globalists spent years developing an “economic nuclear bomb” that was supposed to bring Russia to its knees.
The plan was ambitious: they assumed that unprecedented “sanctions from hell” would essentially block Russia’s access to the outside world, plunging it into economic chaos and ultimately toppling the country’s current ruling elite. Maybe this wouldn’t happen overnight; perhaps it would take years, but the idea was that the Russian government would eventually yield to the demands of a people suffering from the sanctions, and would then yield to Western demands without firing a single shot. This would not only serve as a harsh lesson for Russia but would also send a strong message to the main enemy: China.
Ukraine’s military resistance wasn’t factored into this equation; many will recall that the Pentagon initially estimated that Kiev would fall within three days. Ironically, the US thought that if the 30-million-strong nation found itself under Russian control (the legitimacy of which no country in the world would officially recognize), it would become an unbearable burden for Putin and would only hasten Russia’s economic collapse.
Falling into the trap of its own propaganda
Moscow failed to achieve its goals through a swift and relatively bloodless military operation, while the West eventually realized that its sanctions didn’t achieve the intended effect either – or perhaps even backfired. After brands like Ikea, Starbucks, and Disney left Russia, the Russian people didn’t rise up to overthrow Putin; and the seizure of rich people’s yachts and mansions didn’t spur a regime change either.
In reality, the globalists dramatically overestimated the West’s influence over economic processes, not only in the so-called Global South but even in their own backyard. Three years into the conflict, they still cannot prevent dual-use and military goods from entering Russia, let alone everyday consumer products. Moscow quickly rerouted its trade flows, bypassing the West, found new partners, prioritized import substitution, and, despite certain challenges, achieved noticeable and sustained growth in its economy and foreign trade. All of this turned out to be beyond Western control.
So, the original plan didn’t work out, and this prompted the West to urgently invent a new strategy.
At the same time, the Russian military didn’t take Kiev, and strategically withdrew from northern Ukraine. Vladimir Zelensky convinced NATO countries that this was the result of the military triumph of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). He argued that if the West provided Ukraine with enough weapons, it could hold out for a significant period of time. Back then, in the spring of 2022, the outcome of the economic war was still unclear, and with no better ideas on the table, the West settled on the following plan: the Ukrainian army would wear Russia down in combat, while Western sanctions would do the rest.
The Ramstein meetings on Ukraine became a platform for making major decisions regarding military supplies; at the same time, Western diplomats toured the Global South, urging it to join the economic war against Russia.
At that time, there was still no talk of admitting Ukraine into NATO or directly intervening in the conflict. However, at some point, the West came to believe its own propaganda: it came to think of the Russian army as a paper tiger which might be easier to crush than the Russian economy. At that point, Western leaders became convinced that they could force Putin to bend to their will through military rather than economic means.
This shift occurred in the fall of 2022, after Ukraine’s attack on the Crimean Bridge, and advances in Kherson and Kharkov regions, the chaos of partial mobilization in Russia, and the resulting emigration of some dissenters. At that time, some seemed to believe that one more push could bring Putin down.
Riding this wave of optimism, the globalists approved a major Ukrainian counteroffensive. Throughout the winter of 2022-2023, tank, artillery, and missile units were formed, and new, highly motivated Ukrainian brigades were trained in Western Europe. They were supposed to break through to the Sea of Azov and bring Putin to his knees. For this counteroffensive, the West supplied Ukraine with as many weapons as it could without compromising its own interests.
A suitcase without a handle
Everyone knows how this story ended. Kiev’s operation failed and became a turning point in the conflict. Having fallen far short of achieving its military goals, Kiev lost the trust of its backers who realized that they were initially right to think that Ukraine could never win this conflict on the battlefield.
However, it also became clear that Biden’s doctrine was ineffective. Russia couldn’t be economically crushed and it couldn’t be defeated on the battlefield. So what now?
Since the spring of 2022, we have often pointed out that the West has to make a choice: either engage in serious negotiations with Russia or enter into a direct military conflict. However, no one in NATO has been willing to take responsibility for such a decision – neither the increasingly incapacitated Biden, or Western European politicians. Who are equally unfit, but for different reasons.
For now, all the West can do is continue to send aid to Ukraine, while the latter can still try to hold out on the frontlines. At the same time, the West is trying to “test the ground” about possible negotiations with Moscow, but so far this has amounted to little more than wishful thinking. NATO has convinced itself that the Kremlin will be happy to freeze the conflict without any commitments, as long as such an option is put on the table.
What happens when this third gamble fails as well? Will the West finally shake off its lethargy and make a clear choice, or will it continue to go with the flow?
It seems that all the scheduled participants of the Ramstein meeting were probably happy enough at the news of its cancellation. Clearly, neither the outgoing US president nor NATO’s European members have any viable ideas regarding Ukraine. This means that, at least until the US elections, Ukraine will continue to endure reverses, to the accompaniment of the globalists’ hollow rhetoric.
