Dmitry Trenin: How Russia plans to win in Ukraine

By Dmitry Trenin, a research professor at the Higher School of Economics and a lead research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. He is also a member of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

5 Dec, 2024 21:05 / Updated 7 days ago
NATO knows it has lost its proxy war, but many of its members will still try to prevent a genuine peace

Russia’s military operation in Ukraine has shattered many preconceptions about modern warfare. The ‘drone revolution’ has garnered significant attention, but there is something far more critical at play. The conflict represents a direct, though proxy, clash between two nuclear superpowers in a region of vital importance to one of them.

During the Cold War, these sort of wars were fought on the periphery of great power confrontations, with significantly lower stakes. Today, in Ukraine, much like six decades ago during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the world teeters once more on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe.

The failure of strategic deterrence

The Ukrainian crisis exposed a troubling reality for Russia: its concept of strategic deterrence proved incapable of preventing enemy aggression. While it has successfully deterred a massive nuclear attack by the United States or large-scale conventional aggression by NATO, it has failed to address a new and insidious form of conflict. Washington and its allies have gambled on inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia through a client state—one they control, arm, and direct.

Moscow’s nuclear doctrine, designed for a very different set of circumstances, proved inadequate. It failed to prevent Western intervention at the outset and allowed its escalation. In response, the Kremlin has recognized the need to adapt. In the third year of the operation, a long-overdue update to the doctrine has been announced. This summer, President Vladimir Putin outlined the necessary changes. By November, the new document—entitled Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence—was in place.

What’s new in the doctrine?

The updated doctrine represents a profound shift in Russia’s nuclear policy, transforming it into a proactive deterrent. Previously, nuclear weapons could only be used in conventional conflicts when the very existence of the state was at risk. The threshold was set so high that it effectively allowed adversaries to exploit it. Now, the conditions have been broadened significantly.

One key addition is the recognition of “joint aggression.” If a non-nuclear state at war with Russia operates with the direct support of a nuclear power, Moscow reserves the right to respond, including with nuclear weapons. This sends a clear and unmistakable message to the United States, Britain, and France: their facilities and territories are no longer immune to retaliation.

The doctrine also explicitly accounts for scenarios involving massive aerospace attacks, including drones and cruise missiles, as well as aggression against Belarus. Another important change is the expanded list of threats deemed unacceptable to Russia’s security. These changes collectively signal a more assertive posture, reflecting the reality of today’s conflict and deterring potential Western miscalculations.

The West’s response

Western reactions to these updates were predictable. Media hysteria painted Putin as reckless, while politicians feigned calm, claiming they would “not be intimidated.” The military and intelligence communities have remained largely silent, quietly drawing their own conclusions.

These updates come against an increasingly grim backdrop for the West. Realists within NATO understand the war in Ukraine is effectively lost. The Russian army holds the initiative across the front and is advancing steadily in the Donbass. The Ukrainian armed forces are unlikely to turn the tide in the foreseeable future, if ever. Consequently, Western strategists are now eyeing a ceasefire along the battle lines as the only viable option.

Notably, there has been a subtle shift in the narrative. Articles in Reuters and other Western outlets suggest that Moscow, too, may consider freezing the conflict. However, such a scenario would need to align with Russian interests. For Moscow, anything less than full victory equates to defeat, and such an outcome is simply not an option.

The administration of US President Joe Biden, despite the Democrats crushing election defeat, has apparently decided to ‘help’ Donald Trump stay on course. The authorization to use US and British long-range missiles to hit targets in the Kursk and Bryansk regions is both a defiant challenge to Putin, and a ‘gift’ to the president-elect. Likewise the transfer to Kiev of anti-personnel mines banned by the Ottawa Convention, a new batch of anti-Russian sanctions (including against Gazprombank) and an attempt to ‘push’ the latest Biden aid package for Zelensky through Congress.

The role of ‘Oreshnik’

Russia’s response to the escalation has not been limited to updating its doctrine. The recent test of the ‘Oreshnik’ intermediate-range hypersonic missile under combat conditions marked a pivotal moment. By striking the Yuzhmash missile factory in Dnepropetrovsk, Moscow signaled to NATO that the vast majority of its European capitals are within range of this new weapon.

‘Oreshnik’ carries both conventional and nuclear warheads, and its speed — reportedly reaching up to Mach 10 — renders existing missile defense systems ineffective. Although still experimental, its successful deployment paves the way for mass production. The message is clear: Moscow is not bluffing.

This shift from verbal warnings to decisive actions underscores the seriousness of the Kremlin’s resolve. The West has long convinced itself that Putin would never strike NATO countries. With the advent of ‘Oreshnik,’ that belief has been shattered.

Escalation and the West’s gamble

The United States and its allies continue to escalate recklessly, betting on provoking a Russian overreaction. The authorization of long-range missile strikes on Russian territories like Kursk and Bryansk, combined with the transfer of banned weapons and the constant drumbeat of sanctions, reflects their desperation. More dangerously, there are whispers of Ukraine’s potential NATO membership or even the transfer of nuclear weapons to Kiev. While the latter remains unlikely, the risk of a “dirty bomb” cannot be ruled out.

The West’s hope, however, is that Russia might strike first with atomic weapons, handing NATO the moral high ground. Such an outcome would allow Washington to isolate Moscow globally, undermining its relationships with key players like China, India, and Brazil. Yet Moscow has countered these provocations with calculated precision, refusing to take the bait.

What lies ahead

The deployment of ‘Oreshnik’ and the updated nuclear doctrine reaffirm Moscow’s commitment to achieving peace on its terms. There will be no return to pre-2022 realities or a new Minsk Agreement. Rather, it is about securing Russia’s long-term security and reshaping the geopolitical order in its favor.

As the conflict continues, much depends on the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election. Donald Trump’s potential return to power offers an opportunity for dialogue, though the Kremlin remains skeptical. Regardless of who occupies the White House, Russia will not compromise its objectives.

The stakes are immense. For the West, a Russian victory threatens the United States’ global hegemony, the cohesion of NATO, and the future of the European Union. For Russia, anything less than full victory is unacceptable. As Putin recently stated, “Russia fights for peace, but it will not settle for a disadvantageous one.”

In this high-stakes confrontation, it is Russia’s actions, not its words, that will shape the future. The army continues to fight—not for the Ukraine of yesterday, but for the peace of tomorrow.

This article was first published by Profile.ru, and was translated and edited by the RT team