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10 Dec, 2018 08:19

Brexit fall-out can trigger N. Ireland’s breakaway from UK – ex-Irish deputy PM

British parliamentarians are set to vote on the Brexit deal. How serious of a roadblock is the Irish border issue to the whole process, and can it really go as far as breaking the UK apart? We talked to Eamon Gilmore, former Irish deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs and trade.

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Sophie Shevardnadze: Eamon Gilmore, former Irish deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs and trade, welcome to the show. It’s great to have you with us today. Lots to talk about. Sothe border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has become a key issue in Brexit. United Kingdom seemingly has to choose between staying in the customs union with the EU - or putting up a hard border isolating Northern Ireland. Are these really the only choices, is there a third option that could work? 

Eamon Gilmore: No, I think that summarises it really. The agreement that was made 20 years ago between Ireland and the United Kingdom - the Good Friday Agreement - which provided for the settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland regulates the relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom. And arising from that both the Irish government and the UK government, and indeed all the political parties in Northern Ireland and in the south of Ireland, all do not want to see a hard border. We don’t want to see a return to the days when there were customs posts, when there were soldiers, police, when there was a real physical border there. Right now there’s perfectly free movement between both parts of the island. People traveling from Dublin to Belfast most times don’t know where the border is until they realise that the petrol prices are marked in pounds rather than in euros and the distances in miles rather than kilometres. So the border really is not a physical border at the moment and nobody wants to see a return of that. Of course, if the United Kingdom leaves the customs union as part of its leaving of the European Union that would in effect mean that the border would return. And that’s something that we don’t want to happen. So the discussions that have been taking place over the past two years... 

SS: I talked recently to the British MEP William Dartmouth, he told me that the Irish border issue is a trap set up by the EU for incompetent UK negotiators to trick them into a better deal for the EU. Do you share this view? 

EG: No, I don’t share that view at all. The Irish border issue is a very real issue. It will be the only land border between the United Kingdom and the European Union after Brexit, it’s obviously special in that sense. But it’s also special in the sense that resolving the border issue was a key part of the Good Friday Agreement which was negotiated 20 years ago between Ireland and the United Kingdom, it’s an international agreement which provided for the relationship between Ireland and Northern Ireland, and provided also for the totality of the relationships between the United Kingdom and Ireland. And this was always going to be an issue that was going to have to be resolved as part of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. There are a lot of complex issues involved. There’s customs issue, there are environmental issues, there’s the issue of the single market. All of these issues are involved. I think, it was probably an issue that needed to be addressed more clearly before the referendum took place. But we are where we are, and it has to be addressed now. 

SS: So Northern Ireland and Ireland have lived without a hard border for a long time, although of course they use different currency, different rules, so is a hard border really necessary to control the flow of goods back and forth? 

EG: This is the decision which has been made by the United Kingdom which is to leave the European Union at the time that the Good Friday Agreement was negotiated 20 years ago. And the present arrangements were put in place. The working assumption was that both states were and would remain members of the European Union and the whole construction of that time which recognised the British identity and the Irish identity, made arrangements around the border, were all made under the assumption that both countries would be part of the European Union and therefore the free movement of people, the free movement of goods, the same customs arrangements, the same regulatory arrangements would all apply. Now that the United Kingdom has decided that it wants to leave the European Union obviously that issue has to be addressed. Putting back in place a hard border, accentuating that division between Northern Ireland and Ireland has economic consequences, it has a lot of consequences for people, particularly those who live along the border, there’s a free movement at the moment, people move back and forth. There’s a lot of economic activity, there’s a lot of social activity, and nobody wants to see that disrupted. There’s, of course, also the risk that the imposition of a real hard border again would have for the peace process, which was agreed 20 years ago and has been working very successfully. Nobody wants to go back to the bad old days or anything remotely like that. So for all of those reasons it was necessary to address the border issue as part of these negotiations. 

SS: Perhaps a more or less frictionless goods traffic can be maintained on the Irish border even in a no-deal scenario, under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Would that work? 

EG: No, it has to be provided for. And that’s why the backstop arrangement was agreed last year. Basically what it says is that if we arrive at that point where there’s a divergence between the United Kingdom and the European Union in relation to customs issues then the backstop will apply. The backstop will mean that the arrangements will be made to ensure that there’s not a hard border, in other words, that there continues to be what’s now called in the draft withdrawal agreement as a common customs territory between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and that customs territory will also apply between the United Kingdom and Ireland. 

SS: Let’s say worst comes to worst, and a hard border goes up between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Some are saying this could flare up the old tensions and mess up the Good Friday agreement. Do you think this would be enough to undo 20 years of peace, though? 

EG: Well, first of all, everybody is committed to not having a hard border. So it’s difficult to envisage how a hard border can be brought about. The Irish government, the United Kingdom government, the European Union, political parties in Northern Ireland have all stated very clearly that nobody wants to have a hard border. What therefore has to be agreed are the arrangements that will apply to avoid a hard border. Those arrangements are provided for in the draft withdrawal agreement which is currently under consideration in the British Houses of Parliament. We obviously have to await their decision on that. But everybody from the very early stages of these negotiations have been committed that there will not be a hard border, and whatever has to be done will be done to avoid a hard border. So I think, however this moves forward the commitment that has been given to avoid a hard border will have to be maintained.

SS: Mr. Gilmore, you have once said that Brexit could pave the way to a unified Ireland, and some recent polls show it’s not just you who feels this way. What do you mean? Are you saying that the trouble over the border could lead to a partial break-up of the United Kingdom? 

EG: Well, I think the issue of the united Ireland has certainly come back on the agenda as a result of the Brexit decision much earlier than it had been expected. Some people feel there’s provision in the Good Friday Agreement that there can be a border vote, in other words a referendum - people of Northern Ireland have to say whether they want to remain part of the United Kingdom, or whether they want to be part of the united Ireland. I think it’s more complex than that. I don’t think that it’s going to ever come down to headcount - let’s just have a referendum and let’s just count how many want to be in the united Ireland and how many want to be in the United Kingdom. Because the reality is that there’s a large number of people in Northern Ireland who are British and who value their connection with the rest of the United Kingdom. And therefore that’s what would need to happen as a lot of discussion in advance about an agreed Ireland, what type of future arrangements would apply on the island. So I think that’s the discussion that requires a lot of consideration. I think it needs to be a very reasoned discussion, and it’s probably one that would have to take place over a period of time. There are a lot of issues involved in it, and at the centre of these issues are the two national identities in Northern Ireland. There are the Irish identity people who consider themselves Irish and hold Irish passports, and people who consider themselves British and who value the connections with the United Kingdom. So that’s something that just cannot be resolved by a simple headcount being conducted anytime soon. 

SS: Mr. Gilmore, what Brexit scenario would potentially set up a move to unite Ireland? Will having a hard border incite people to vote to leave the UK, or maybe having no border will contribute further to actual island unity?

EG: Well, I think there are… I think we have to see how this develops over a period of time. I think there are a number of factors that come into play, I think they are not all to do with the issue of the border in Ireland. I think there is also a dynamic within the United Kingdom itself. The question of Scotland, for example, if the issue of Scottish independence were to come back to the table again, how would that play in relation to Northern Ireland? I think also there is the future economic development. The reality is that there is no good Brexit. Brexit… I don’t think it’s going to work well for anybody. So if, for example, there were a divergence in the economies between Ireland and the United Kingdom, or between the European Union and the United Kingdom, I think that’s a factor that would come into play. But again, I think it comes back to the question of what arrangements, what type of vision do we have in Ireland for the future of our island? And I think that that is a discussion that has to take place between the people who live on the island, and that includes the people whose identity is British. This is a very careful discussion that has to take place, I think, over a period of time. I think it’s back on the agenda at a much earlier stage than anyone expected because of the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. Nevertheless, i think it is a discussion that cannot be rushed, that has to look at all of the aspects, identity, cultural aspects, economic aspects, the future arrangements within the island of Ireland, the relationship with the European Union, relationship with the United Kingdom. It’s a complex issue, and I don’t think it can be rushed, I think time needs to be taken with it, and I think it requires a lot of very sensible, rational and informed discussion. 

SS: Like you said, there is no good Brexit, and tensions run high as the vote on Theresa May's Brexit deal is looming. What are your expectations for this day of reckoning, will the deal go through in the Parliament? 

EG: Well, I was in London, and I was in Westminster, just on different business, but meeting informally with some MPs… It looks to me like the numbers are not there at the moment for the agreement to be passed by the House of Commons. I think the issue will be what happens afterwards if… Because it doesn’t appear to me that there is any majority for a very clear alternative either. So if it doesn’t go through, I think there will be a period of uncertainty as to what is going to happen. I know there’s a provision for the British government to set out what it intends to do in the event of Parliament not accepting the treaty, but we will just have to wait and see, this is very much a British decision now, it’s very much a matter for the Members of Parliament, who have been elected by the British people, to make this decision. 

SS: Sure, and for instance, the Democratic Unionist Party has already pledged to down the draft deal, and they are also threatening to pull out from the coalition with Tories if May doesn’t come up with a suitable solution of the Irish border issue. Can that happen? What will that mean for May’s government and Brexit as a whole? 

EG: I think we’re heading into the unknown. This, a country leaving the European Union, has never happened before, so this is unprecedented in that sense. I think the degree to which there is political uncertainty in London, certainly in my memory... I cannot recall any previous occasion when there seemed to be the same degree of division, and indeed, the divisions within the main political party. So I think the political outcome of this decision in Westminster is uncertain. There has been a lot of speculation as to what might happen if the Parliament votes this down. Is it possible that Prime Minister might talk again with Brussels, and some clarifications are sought for the agreement that would cause another vote to take place in Parliament? I don’t know. Is there an alternative being proposed by those who are going to vote against it? Do they have an alternative that they would put to Parliament, which would command a majority? We haven’t seen that yet. And meanwhile, as you know, the momentum, I think, is continuing to grow in the United Kingdom for a second vote of the people to make a decision on that. And I think if Parliament doesn’t make a decision, I think if we find ourselves at Christmas and New Year without a decision being made by the Parliament, I think that momentum is likely to increase in the new year, I think people will say: “Well, you know, the Parliament hasn’t been able to resolve this, the people have to make the ultimate decision.” 

SS: So if the plan is rejected, if May’s plan is rejected, what happens to the EU-UK negotiations? Can there be another deal hammered out that would be accepted by all 27 EU states - which sounds, like, very complicated, time-consuming? 

EG: Well, it is very complicated. If you look at this agreement, it’s 600 pages, it’s a lot of detail, it’s covering everything from what happens to UK citizens who are living in EU countries, what’s their pension, their social welfare payments, their health services, what happens to people from EU countries who are working in the UK, students, what happens to trade, what happens if somebody is arrested, for example, on the 29th of March 2019, and they haven’t been transferred to the other country… All of these issues are provided for in the agreement. Now, if there isn’t an agreement, well, I think we’re very much into uncertain territory. There is the provision that the deadline, the 29th of March 2019, that it can be extended by agreement. The British Prime Minister has said that she is not countenancing that. I think if it were to allow for more time to discuss and debate things, I think there may well be agreement on that, but of course, it does require the agreement of all 27 member states remaining in the European Union to agree to that extension of time. That’s probably the most likely scenario. It’s very difficult to countenance a situation that would arise on the 29th of March where there is no agreement. I think it’s a recipe for chaos, I think a lot of things, if you look at the detail of what’s in the agreement, and that agreement does not apply, the absence of an agreement… I think we’re in very, very uncharted waters. 

SS: So, most of Ireland’s trade with the EU goes through British ports. What’s Ireland’s plan in case of a no-deal Brexit - suffering through the tariffs or trying to limit its reliance on the land bridge? Which would prove more costly? 

EG: Well, I think there would be a number of… Well, there are options, of course. I mean, there are sea connections between Irish ports and ports on the continental mainland, I think, I would expect that they would be… That the use of those would probably be increased, I think there would probably be an increased use of air travel for goods on to the continent, the mainland. It certainly has economic consequences. There’s a lot of goods at the moment which travel from Ireland to the UK, through the UK and on to the continental mainland. Of course, it also works in the other direction. A lot of UK imports coming from the continent of Europe come by sea, and, of course, the UK’s own trade with Ireland is also very large. Ireland is the UK’s 5th largest trading partner. There’s trade every week between Ireland and the United Kingdom in the amount of about 1€ billion, it’s a huge amount of trade between the two islands, and that would be seriously disrupted by a no-deal situation. The sensible thing, clearly, is that there is an agreement, that there is an agreed arrangement as to what will happen on the 29th of March. I’d prefer if it wasn’t happening at all, but it is happening, and therefore, if it is happening, it’s better that it’s done on an agreed basis whereby there are arrangements put in place that envisage all kinds of scenarios. And of course, one of the things that the withdrawal treaty also does is that it puts in place an arrangement between the European Union and the United Kingdom to deal with the things that perhaps may have been overlooked, or new problems that may arise in the arrangement, and it provides for this 2-year period within which there will be a phasing out of the arrangement, and where the future arrangement between the European Union and the UK, including the trade deal arrangement, can be agreed. That’s the sensible way to do it. I think a situation where it comes to a cliff edge, there’s no agreement, I think that’s the worst of all scenarios. 

SS: What about the flow of people, not just goods, not just goods and trade? Could the Common Travel Area arrangements between the UK and Ireland turn it into, I don’t know, a backdoor for illegal migration into the UK in case of a no-deal? 

EG: I don’t think so. First of all, there was a Common Travel Area between Ireland and the United Kingdom before both countries, and we both joined the European Union, the European common market,as it then was, on the same day in 1973, so the Common Travel arrangement pre-dated that. There are arrangements that can be put in place at airports and ports, I recall, during the years of the Troubles in Ireland, where, you know, there were… People had to go through certain channels at airports if they were travelling to the UK. So there are ways in which that can be addressed.

SS: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Gilmore, for this interview.


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